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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRIXEN & CHRISTOPHER 
ARCHITECTS, a professional 
corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ROGER H. ELTON and 
JOHN H. LAUB, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 860576 
Category No. 14(b) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT BRIXEN & CHRISTOPHER ARCHITECTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
On August 4, 1987, appellant John H. Laub filed a 
federal bankruptcy petition and the parties may be subject in 
this action to the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), which 
operates with respect to Hthe . . . continuation . . . of a 
judicial . . . proceeding against the debtor that was . . . 
commenced before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case.H 
Accordingly, the parties stipulated to stay the appeal of John 
H. Laub, and this brief is filed only as to appellant Elton. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Respondent Brixen & Christopher Architects 
(hereinafter HBrixen & Christopher**) is satisfied with the 
statement of appellant Elton regarding jurisdiction and the 
nature of the proceedings below. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. The attempt by Elton to frame his first issue 
(••Whether the trial court was entitled to render judgment in 
favor of Respondents [sic] (. . . Brixen & Christopher) 
contrary to the written provisions of Brixen & Christopher's 
own letter and architectural form contract which combined 
documents the lower court specifically determined to be the 
contract between the parties.-) wrongly assumes that the trial 
court judgment is contrary to the contract. In fact/ the trial 
court judgment against Elton is in accordance with the contract. 
B. Brixen & Christopher is satisfied with the second 
issue stated by Elton: "Whether the trial court incorrectly 
determined that Appellants . . . were estopped to deny that 
Brixen & Christopher's services were authorized." The trial 
court correctly ruled that Elton was so estopped. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This is respondent Brixen & 
Christopher's action to recover amounts owed to it for 
architectural services performed for appellants Roger H. Elton 
and John H. Laub# who were developing the "Wolf Creek 
Recreation Center" in Eden/ Utah. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below. 
After a 3-day trial on Brixen & Christopher's complaint/ the 
Honorable Scott Daniels, sitting without jury, awarded Brixen & 
Christopher judgment against Elton and Laub in the amount of 
$50/500 plus interest and costs. 
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The trial court found that Brixen & Christopher had 
provided architectural services as requested by Elton and Laub, 
that Brixen & Christopher kept Elton and Laub informed of 
progress with the design throughout the project, that Elton and 
Laub never objected to Brixen & Christopher's interim billings, 
and that, when Brixen & Christopher sought payment for the 
services based on which judgment was awarded/ Elton told Brixen 
& Christopher that he was pleased with their work, agreed that 
payment was long overdue, and promised on more than one 
occasion that payment would be made. 
Relief sought on appeal. Brixen & Christopher 
requests that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court 
against Elton. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts by Elton relies on his side of 
conflicting evidence and ignores the findings of fact of the 
trial court while at the same time implicitly attacking them. 
The treatment of the findings by Elton is inconsistent with the 
standards established by this Court. This language of 
Redevelopment Agency v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296 (Utah 1987) 
applies with equal force here: 
[A]ppellantsf claims are predicated on our 
acceptance of their version of the events which 
occurred and how the trial courts should have 
perceived the circumstances as they existed. However/ 
the facts appellants advance in support of their 
arguments are carefully chosen to the exclusion of 
other evidence in the records supporting the lower 
courts' decisions. Due to the trial court's 
advantaged position/ the presumptions favor its 
judgment. Where there is dispute and disagreement in 
the evidence, we assume that the trial judge believed 
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those aspects and fairly drew the inferences to be 
derived therefrom which gave his decision support. To 
this end, neither trial judge found credible the 
evidence appellants marshalled. 
Id. at 1301-02 (footnotes omitted)-1 
The facts are appropriately set forth in the trial 
court's detailed findings of fact, R 52-57. Brixen & 
Christopher states those findings here with citations to the 
record supporting the findings and with footnotes showing that, 
contrary to the MfactsH claimed by Elton, the facts found by 
the trial court are supported by the record: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In the period from March 1982 to January 1983, 
plaintiff Brixen & Christopher Architects, a Utah architectural 
professional corporation, ("Brixen & Christopher") performed 
architectural services for defendants Roger H. Elton and John 
H. Laub, who were developing the "Wolf Creek Recreation Center" 
1
 See also Nupetco Associates v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 882 
(Utah 1983) ("[T]he evidence and all of the inferences that can 
reasonably be drawn therefrom [are viewed] in the light most 
favorable to the findings and conclusions of the trial court 
. . . . " ) ; Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1985) 
("On appeal, the findings of the trial court will not be 
disturbed unless there is no substantial record evidence to 
support them. . . . In reviewing the evidence, we view it in 
the light most favorable to the trial court."); Scharf v. BMG 
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) ("To mount a successful 
attack on the trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must 
marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in light 
most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient 
to support the findings.") (citations omitted); 5A J. Moore & 
J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice § 52.06[1], at 52-151 and 
-152 (2d ed. 1986). 
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in Eden, Utah. [R 145, R 267-68, ex. 1]. The real property 
onwhich the recreation center was to be built was owned solely 
by Laub. [R 389-90, R 441]. 
2. Elton and Laub told James W. Christopher, a 
principal of Brixen & Christopher, that they were partners and 
at all times, by their words and conduct with respect to Brixen 
& Christopher, Elton and Laub acted as if they were partners. 
[R 148, R 290, R 389-90, R 458, ex. 1 (pages 98, 94-93, 88, 
85-81, 79-76, 57, 54, 48-47, 46-45, 34-33, 3-1)]. 
3. Following the first meeting between Christopher, 
Elton, and Laub on March 3, 1982, Elton and Laub signed an 
initial letter agreement, dated March 4, 1982, whereby Brixen & 
Christopher agreed to provide preliminary architectural design 
services in connection with the planned Wolf Creek Recreation 
Center for a fee of $7,500.00 (Exhibit M1 H). [R 145-46, 
R 396-97, R 445-46, ex. 1 (pages 3-1)]. 
4. An attachment to the initial letter agreement 
indicated that the total architectural services would be in 
five phases: (1) programming and schematic design, (2) design 
development, (3) construction [or contract] documents, (4) 
bidding or negotiation, and (5) construction administration. 
The initial letter agreement covered the first phase only. The 
stated fee for the first phase was $7,500.00 (Exhibit Hl"). 
[Ex. 1, pages 3-1]. 
5. Brixen & Christopher proceeded with work on the 
project and held additional meetings both with Elton and Laub 
and with employees of Wolf Creek. [R 142-47, 151-52]. 
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6. Several preliminary drawings were prepared. 
Changes were made to respond to concerns of Wolf Creek, 
particularly those of Laub. [R 155-59]. By July 28, 1982, the 
programming and schematic design phase, referred to in the 
initial letter agreement, had been completed. At a meeting 
that day, Elton and Laub authorized Brixen & Christopher to 
proceed with the balance of the architectural services in 
connection with the recreation center.2 [R 165-66, R 315-18]. 
Christopher was told to prepare a contract to reflect this 
authorization [R 167-68] and that Elton would be his contact. 
[R 172] • 
7. On or about July 29, 1982, Brixen & Christopher 
issued to Elton and Laub a statement showing that the 
programming and schematic design phase had been completed, that 
the hourly fees on that phase had exceeded the agreed upon 
limit of $7,500.00, and that the $7,500.00 fee was then due. 
[R 278, R 286, ex. 1 (page 91)]. 
2
 Elton observes that at trial he and Laub -denied giving 
approval to proceed with the other phases- and -testified that 
Christopher said Brixen & Christopher wanted to continue 
working on first phase requirements.- Brief of Elton and Laub 
at 4-5 (paras. 9-10; see also para. 11). But as Elton notes, 
Christopher testified that the approval was given, R 165-66, R 
315-18, and he confirmed it by letter, ex. 1 (pages 34-30). 
The refinements discussed at the July 28, 1982 meeting were 
part of the second -design development- phase, not the first 
-schematic design- phase. R 313-17, R 370. (In any event, the 
refinements were completed shortly after the July 28, 1982 
meeting. R 318.) Brixen & Christopher even sent Elton and 
Laub a bill for the completed schematic design phase. R 278, 
ex. 1 (page 91). Elton and Laub did not object to the letter 
and had orally agreed to the terms of the letter, R 53 
(findings of fact, para. 8), R 168-69. Elton promised 
(Footnote 2 continued on next page.) 
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8. On Monday, August 2, 1982, Christopher sent Elton 
and Laub a letter which confirmed Elton and Laub's decision to 
proceed with the architectural work on the recreation center 
and set forth the fee arrangement by which Brixen & Christopher 
Architects would be compensated for doing so. (Exhibits "1M 
[pages 34-30] & H42w). While the August 2, 1982 letter was 
never signed by Laub and Elton, they had orally agreed to its 
terms, and Brixen & Christopher proceeded with the authorized 
architectural work as set forth in the letter agreement with 
the full knowledge of Elton and Laub.3 [R 168-69, R 321]. 
9. Brixen & Christopher hired consultants to work on 
site design, as well as electrical, mechanical and structural 
(Footnote 2 cont.) 
that he and Laub would sign and return the letter. R 321. 
They even prepared a check, which Laub assumed was delivered, 
to pay the bill, R 54 (findings of fact, para. 12), R 461-62, 
ex. 45. Last, but not least, they admitted owing the money. R 
56-57 (findings of fact, paras. 18, 23-25), R 266, R 273-76, R 
279-81, ex. 1 (pages 98-97, 87-88, 85, 79). In light of 
overwhelming evidence, the trial court for good reason did not 
believe the denials and testimony of Elton and Laub. 
3
 Elton invites this Court to ignore this finding and the 
substantial evidence supporting it and instead believe the 
incredible trial testimony of Elton and Laub, which no writing 
supports, that they objected to the August 2, 1982 letter. See 
Brief of Elton and Laub at 5-6 (paras. 12-14). Elton claims in 
particular that, contrary to the letter, he and Laub placed an 
$800,000 limit on the total cost of the project, including site 
development, but as to this claim also, he acknowledges 
evidence conflicting with his position. Brief of Elton and 
Laub at 3 & 5 (paras. 3 & 12). Christopher testified that the 
initial $800,000 estimate was for the Recreation Center only, 
excluding site development. It is not reasonable to think that 
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engineering design.4 [R 174# R 177-78, R 205-10 (structural), 
R 222-28 (mechanical), R 239-42 (electrical), R 250-54 (site), 
R 285] . 
10. By August 31, 1982, requirements for a fall 1982 
construction commitment were being reviewed. [R 180, ex. 1 
(page 41)]. More meetings and correspondence occurred. [R 
180-85, ex. 1 (pages 46-42)]. Brixen & Christopher assisted 
Wolf Creek in proceedings before the Weber County Planning 
Commission. [R 463, R 471]. 
11. In addition to communicating progress on the 
project to Elton and Laub, Brixen & Christopher worked closely 
(Footnote 3 cont.) 
if the construction estimate had actually been 50%, or 
$400,000, more than Elton and Laub planned to spend that 
Christopher would have totally ignored such an owner mandate 
and continued to work on the project based on substantially 
larger figures, see ex. 1 (pages 34 & 57), and that Elton and 
Laub would not have generated some document or at least some 
scrap of paper reflecting the alleged discrepancy. Even their 
deposition testimony conflicts with Elton's claims. Laub 
testified in his deposition that he tried to keep all 
communications through Elton, R 463-64, and that he never 
contacted Brixen & Christopher about the August 2 letter, R 
459-60 (trial transcript in error refers to August 2 letter as 
August 26th letter). Elton testified in his deposition that he 
did not even recall the critical July 28, 1982 meeting on which 
the letter agreement was based, R 424, or an earlier March 10, 
1982 meeting, R 421. Thus Elton's vivid "recollection" of 
these meetings at trial was unreliable, at least. As 
Christopher testified, at no time did Elton or Laub comment 
that the construction estimates were too high. R 329, 
R 478-79. The trial court was well within its province when it 
rejected the testimony of Elton and Laub and made its finding 
that the August 2, 1982 agreement was accepted and that Elton 
and Laub authorized Brixen and Christopher to proceed in 
accordance with it. 
4
 The schematic design phase provided for in the original 
contract did not continue into the fall, see, e.g., R 315-318, 
-8-
with the Wolf Creek employees and with Great Basin Engineering, 
who had been hired by Wolf Creek for the master site planning 
of all resort facilities. [R 162-63, R 172, R 178-82, R 
186-88, R 190-92, R 196-98, R 201-02, R 266, R 269.] 
12. A check of Wolf Creek Resort to Brixen & 
Christopher for $7,500.00, dated September 23, 1982, was signed 
by Laub. Although Laub assumed that it was delivered to Brixen 
& Christopher, it was not.5 
(Footnote 4 cont.) 
as Elton suggests. Brief of Elton and Laub at 8-9 (para. 28). 
When Christopher proposed the amendment to raise the total fee, 
he simply proportioned the $8,000 total fee increase among all 
four phases, including the schematic design phase. R 363. The 
fee increase was due to increased engineering consultant fees, 
R 201, and part of the rationale for adding part to the 
schematic design phase was that some of the work responsible 
for the increased engineering consultant fees was "schematic 
design" in the eyes of the engineers. R 349. But as 
Christopher testified, Hwe had completed structural schematics 
in our initial work prior to the end of July. Then his [the 
engineer's] work starts, and he will call it schematics, but 
it's unrelated to what we do as part of our agreement under 
schematics." R 349. The assertion by Elton that the schematic 
design phase continued into the fall is disingenuous, because 
not only did he and Laub receive a bill in the summer for 
completion of the schematic design phase based on their 
approval, R 278, ex. 1 (page 91), but they even prepared a 
check in September 1982 to pay the bill. R 461-62, ex. 45. 
5
 From the time of his deposition to the time of trial, 
Laub went from assuming that the check had been delivered, 
R 460-62, to claiming that (1) the check had been purposely 
withheld "for delivery to Brixen & Christopher to pay for the 
first phase at the time it became acceptable," see Brief of 
Elton and Laub at 9 (para. 30), and (2) that he had told 
Christopher this, R 465. In light of Laub's conflicting 
deposition testimony and the contrary testimony of Christopher, 
R 474, the trial court properly made this finding in favor of 
Brixen & Christopher and further found that Elton and Laub 
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13. On about September 30, 1982, Brixen & 
Christopher: (1) issued a statement to Elton and Laub for a 
fee then due of $10,000.00, $7,500.00 of which represented the 
July 29, 1982 statement and $2,500.00 of which represented the 
partial completion of design development and contract documents 
for the bid package for site excavation and preparation, and 
(2) sent Elton and Laub a letter updating them on progress on 
the project. [R 187, R 278, ex. 1 (pages 90, 48-47)]. 
14. On October 4, 1982, Christopher delivered a bid 
package, including drawings and specifications for site work, 
to Wolf Creek employees. These documents were distributed to 
contractors to invite bids. About October 11, 1982, bids were 
received by Wolf Creek for the site work, one of which was 
favorable in that it was below the estimate. [R 188-93, R 477, 
ex. 1 (page 97)]. 
15. By letter dated November 26, 1982, and pursuant 
to a prior telephone conversation between Elton and 
Christopher, Christopher sent Elton and Laub an amendment to 
the August 2 letter agreement to reflect increased 
architectural fees based on increased consulting fees required 
(Footnote 5 cont.) 
never objected to the statements for services billed by Brixen 
& Christopher. R 56 (findings of fact, para. 21). 
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for structural and mechanical engineering design.6 The letter 
requested review of the amendment and execution if the 
amendment was acceptable. Elton and Laub neither executed the 
amendment nor communicated their acceptance of the amendment7 
6
 The "note" of Elton about Brixen & Christopher's proposal 
for increased compensation, Brief of Elton and Laub at 6 (para. 
18), is gratuitous because Brixen & Christopher has not 
appealed the trial court's ruling that the proposed amendment 
was not accepted. Elton is dead wrong in claiming that the 
judgment includes $8,500.00 for the schematic design phase, 
$1,000.00 more than the original $7,500.00 fee based on the 
allocation proposed in the amendment. See Brief of Elton and 
Laub at 17. The court's ruling is crystal clear in excluding 
from the judgment "the additional $8,000.00 fee" that was 
proposed by the amendment. R 503-04. What the court did in 
fact is award an amount based on allocating a total $71,500.00 
fee between on the one hand completion of the first and second 
phase and partial completion of the third phase and, on the 
other hand, the remainder of the third phase and all of the 
fourth phase. The precise basis for the trial court's 
calculation was not stated and defendants never objected or 
requested clarification in the trial court. 
If anything, the trial court's allocation understated the 
amount to which Brixen and Christopher was entitled because, 
according to the allocation in the August 2 letter, Brixen and 
Christopher performed at least 69.4% (($16,500.00 + $25,500.00) 
/ $60,500.00) of the work comprising the second, third and 
fourth phases. Since the amount attributable to the last three 
phases is $64,000.00 ($71,500.00 - $7,500.00), the total award 
to Brixen & Christopher on a strictly proportionate basis for 
all work performed would be almost $52,000.00 ((69.4% of 
$64,000.00) + $7,500.00 = $51,916.00), about $1,500 more than 
the $50,500 awarded. 
7
 Elton misstates the testimony when he claims that 
"Christopher . . . admitted that everything was conditional" in 
November 1982. Brief of Elton and Laub at 8 (para. 26). 
Christopher merely agreed with counsel for Elton and Laub that 
the proposed amendment, which Christopher had discussed with 
Elton by telephone, was conditional, not that "everything" was 
(Footnote 7 continued on next page.) 
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Enclosed with the letter was a statement dated November 26, 
1982 for $27,500.00, which represented compensation for 
completion of the programming and schematic design phase and 
the design development phase as revised by the amendment.8 
[R 278-79, ex. 42.] 
16. Architectural work on the project continued. On 
January 17, 1983, Brixen & Christopher issued a statement for 
$57,500.00 in accordance with the August 2, 1986 letter 
(Footnote 7 continued.) 
conditional. R 344. As noted above, as the trial court found, 
the terms of the August 2 letter agreement already had been 
accepted even though Elton and Laub neglected to sign it as 
Elton had promised. R 53 (findings of fact, para. 8), R 321. 
8
 From this billing alone, Elton and Laub knew that Brixen 
& Christopher had completed the design development phase. The 
assertion of Elton that Brixen & Christopher did not properly 
provide cost estimates is unfounded. The contract does not 
require Ma detailed breakdown of costs*1 in the first phase, see 
Brief of Elton and Laub at 7 (para. 21), but rather **a 
Statement of Probable Cost based on current area, volume or 
other unit costs." Ex. 1 (page 32) (emphasis added). This 
statement based on area was provided, inter alia, in the August 
2 letter, which referred to the "construction estimate of 
$897,750 (19,950 square feet at $45.00) plus site development 
costs of $295,000 as estimated by Maas & Grassli.** Ex. 1 (page 
34.) Elton acknowledges further that a "detailed breakdown of 
costs of the Project** was prepared in October 1982 and 
submitted to Elton and Laub, Brief of Elton and Laub at 7 
(para. 21), which was in the second phase, "design 
development." Contrary to Elton's claim that "Christopher 
admitted that Elton was concerned about the cost estimate 
submitted in October, 1982," Brief of Elton and Laub at 7 
(para. 22), Christopher testified that he did not believe that 
Elton ever expressed any concern about the cost estimate. R 
329. As would be the case with any project, Christopher 
acknowledged only that there was a general concern throughout 
about keeping costs down. R 329. 
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agreement as amended by the November 26 amendment. The 
statement was based on the $27,500.00 prior statement for the 
first two phases and $30,000.00 for 85% completion of the third 
phase, the construction documents phase. By this time, Brixen 
& Christopher had completed the first two phases, 85% or more 
of the third phase and some work on the fourth phase in 
connection with the site work bid package.9 [R 266-69, ex. 1 
(pages 92 & 79)]. 
17. Based on the August 2, 1982 letter agreement and 
the extent of the services performed, Brixen & Christopher is 
entitled to payment in the amount of $50,500.00. [R 504-05; 
see supra note 6]. 
18. By telephone conversation with Elton on January 
17, 1983, Christopher asked Elton for payment. Elton said that 
9
 Brixen & Christopher did not merely, as Elton states, 
"allegedly" perform work to this extent. Brief of Elton and 
Laub at 9 (para. 31). Brixen & Christopher proved at 
trial by substantial documentary and testimonial evidence, 
including dozens of drawings renderings, and prints, that it 
actually did work to this extent and the trial court 
accordingly so found. Elton's position that Brixen & 
Christopher was catering to every whim of Wolf Creek (Elton, 
Laub, and staff), spending over 2,000 hours of architectural 
staff time, and incurring expenses of over $25,000 for 
engineering, R 284-88, ex. 10, in a never-ending effort to earn 
a mere $7,500 gross fee is meritless. It is true that, as 
Elton points out, Brief of Elton and Laub at 9 (para. 31), they 
did not, despite their promises to do so, sign and return the 
August 2, 1982 agreement, R 321, or pay Brixen & Christopher, R 
200-201, R 266, R 273-276. Brixen & Christopher can hardly be 
faulted for having believed that Elton and Laub would keep 
their word. 
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he was ill, but would try to facilitate payment. [R 266, ex. 1 
(page 79)] . 
19. By letter dated February 23, 1983, Elton 
authorized a change to an alternative mechanical system design 
after being informed of estimated costs and benefits of the 
proposed alternative system. [R 272-73, ex. 1 (pages 84-80)].10 
20. Due to lack of payment, architectural work on the 
project gradually came to a halt. [R 273, ex. 10]. 
10
 This letter is one example of communications of Elton 
that refute the groundless conclusion that "[a]11 of Elton's 
communications after August 2, 1982 to Brixen & Christopher 
. . . were consistent with Elton and Laub's understanding that 
Brixen & Christopher was allegedly trying to provide an 
acceptable [schematic] design.M Brief of Elton and Laub at 
9-10 (para. 32). In the letter, Elton shows awareness that the 
project would soon be entering the fourth phase, the bidding 
and negotiation phase, when he states in his February 23, 1983 
letter: "When Wolf Creek goes to bid on the Recreation Center, 
we should have incorporated the mechanical systems change you 
discussed with Scott." Ex. 1 (page 84) (emphasis added). 
Elton hardly could have thought otherwise because (1) the 
February 8, 1983 letter of Christopher, to which Elton was 
responding, informed Elton that changing the mechanical system 
would require $4,380 in "redesign feesH, ex. 1 (page 83-82) 
(emphasis added); (2) Elton had received the January 17, 1983 
bill that indicated the contract or construction documents were 
85% complete or, in other words, that the first and second 
phases were complete and the third phase was nearly complete, R 
268, ex. 1 (page 92); (3) Elton had been told when Christopher 
gave him a status report on January 17, 1983 that the contract 
documents were nearly complete and ready for bidding, R 266, 
ex. 1 (page 79); (4) Elton had known at least since receiving 
Brixen & Christopher's November 26, 1983 statement that, as the 
statement indicated, the second phase was complete, R 278-79, 
ex. 42; (5) Elton had been informed by Christopher's November 
26, 1983 letter that the statement covered "services to date 
through completion of Design Development." Ex. 1 (page 77); 
ex. 42. Like Elton's February 23, 1983 letter, his other 
letters belie his claims. On October 11, 1982, Elton wrote 
Laub: 
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21. Throughout the project, Brixen & Christopher kept 
Elton and Laub informed of progress with the design and was 
never told in substance that (1) its work was going too far, or 
(2) its statements for services were not acceptable. [R 266, R 
269, R 273, R 276, R 278-89, R 464]. 
(Footnote 10 continued.) 
Enclosed are two copies of the Christopher 
Recreation Center proposal he would like to have 
signed. 
Please advise if you have questions. 
R 426-27, ex. 43. The next day, October 12, 1982, Elton again 
wrote Laub: 
Jim Christopher called concerning the 
whereabouts of his contractual agreement and payment 
of services. 
He has not paid Grassli because he has not 
received monies from us. 
R 426-27, ex. 44. There is no hint in the letters of any 
objection being expressed to Christopher that he should not 
expect the agreement to be signed and returned or the payment 
to be made. Christopher's request for the agreement and 
payment and Elton's acquiescence in early October also casts 
grave doubt on Laub's "memory" at trial, contrary to his 
deposition testimony, R 463-64, that he told Christopher just 
days before that the agreement would not be signed and payment 
would not be made. 
Elton's December 1, 1986 letter to Laub serves to 
further impeach the testimony of Elton. In the letter he 
states: 
Enclosed, for your information, is the Recreation 
Center architectural contract on Wolf Creek, together 
with a change order. I am not sure the change order 
(Footnote 10 continued on next page.) 
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22. There was no term of the parties' agreement that 
provided that the agreement was not to be performed within one 
year from the making of the agreement. In other words, the 
agreement could have been performed in one year. Also, Brixen 
& Christopher had partially performed the agreement. 
23. On March 2, 1983, after receiving Elton's 
February 23 letter, Christopher spoke to Elton by telephone. 
Elton agreed that payment to Brixen & Christopher was long 
overdue. Elton told Christopher that he and Laub were 
expecting a $500,000.00 cash investment. Christopher said the 
payment was needed that week. Elton said that he would call 
Laub and then call Christopher back. [R 273, ex. 1 (page 85)]. 
24. On March 4, 1983, Elton called Christopher back. 
He told Christopher that the extra $500,00.00 cash was coming 
soon and that the money should be in First Security Bank by the 
middle of next week. Elton promised the payment would be made 
(Footnote 10 continued.) 
is justified. Could you have Clair [Cox] or Scott [Allen] 
[Wolf Creek employees] make a determination? 
Ex. 42 (emphasis added). Elton had a question only about the 
change order, which the trial court found was ultimately not 
accepted, not about "the Recreation Center architectural 
contract," which the trial court found, based on abundant 
evidence, was accepted. Similarly, Elton enclosed with the 
letter a copy of Christopher's November 26 letter and the 
accompanying bill without taking any exception to the fact that 
they reflected that the design development phase had been 
completed. 
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immediately/ no later than March 14 or 15. [R 273-74, ex. 1 
(page 85)]. 
25. On April 16, 1983, Christopher visited Elton in 
Reno. Elton told Christopher that financing was close and that 
interest would be paid on the amount outstanding. Elton also 
told Christopher that he was pleased with the work of Brixen & 
Christopher.11 [R 275-76, ex. 1 (page 88)]. 
26. No payment was ever made to Brixen & 
Christopher's for the architectural work it performed on the 
Wolf Creek Recreation Center. [R 274]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED BRIXEN & 
CHRISTOPHER JUDGMENT BASED ON THE AUGUST 2, 1982 
LETTER AGREEMENT. 
The trial court judgment is consistent with the 
parties' contract. The transcript of the court's ruling and 
its findings and conclusions reflect a cogent application of 
the August 2 letter agreement and lend no support to the 
1 1
 Even after Laub had answered the complaint in March 1984 
and denied "that defendents Laub or Elton entered into an 
agreement or employment contract with plaintiff [Brixen & 
Christopher]," R 13, Laub met regarding payment with 
Christopher and the other firm principal, Martin Brixen, on 
July 27, 1984 at the offices of Brixen & Christopher. 
R 279-81, R 476-77. As reflected in Christopher's two pages of 
notes, ex. 1, pages 98-97, Laub said he was in financial 
trouble but did not deny that the money was due Brixen & 
Christopher. R 280-81. Laub did not contradict Christopher's 
testimony about this meeting. 
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rhetorical charge of Elton that the trial court sought to 
"ignore" or "remake" the contract. Brixen & Christopher did 
everything necessary to earn the amounts awarded by the trial 
court. As found by the trial court, Elton and Laub were 
completely aware of the extent of work being performed by 
Brixen & Christopher, authorized the work to the full extent 
that it was performed, and admitted to Brixen & Christopher 
their liability for services performed. 
POINT II. ELTON IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT BRIXEN & 
CHRISTOPHER'S SERVICES WERE AUTHORIZED. 
In light of Brixen & Christopher's dutiful 
communication of progress throughout the project and the 
complete absence of any objection by Elton and Laub to Brixen & 
Christopher's statements about the extent to which the work had 
been performed and the extent to which compensation had been 
earned, Elton's attempt to raise the technical objection that 
approval lacked sufficient formality is unwarranted. Elton and 
Laub urged Brixen & Christopher onward, and silently accepted 
Brixen & Christopher's reports and billings throughout the 
project as Brixen & Christopher performed. To permit Elton to 
escape liability would be grossly unfair. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED BRIXEN & 
CHRISTOPHER JUDGMENT BASED ON THE AUGUST 2, 1982 
LETTER AGREEMENT. 
The trial court did not "remake" or "ignore- the 
parties' contract/ as Elton asserts, and it would have had to 
have done so in order to absolve Elton of his responsibility to 
pay Brixen & Christopher for its architectural services. 
Brixen & Christopher was retained for the first "schematic 
design" phase in March 1982. Brixen & Christopher documented 
this in writing to Elton and Laub. This phase was completed 
and approved at the end of July 1982. Brixen & Christopher 
documented this in writing to Elton & Laub and billed for the 
completion of the schematic design phase. Ex. 1 (pages 34-33). 
Next, Brixen & Christopher proceeded with the second 
"design development" phase. Working closely with the Wolf 
Creek staff as instructed, and keeping Elton and Laub informed 
every step of the way, Brixen & Christopher billed Elton and 
Laub for progress on the design development phase at the end of 
September 1982. Ex. 1 (page 90). Elton and Laub also had to 
know that design development was in progress at this point 
because of the involvement of the engineering consultants. R 
362, ex. 1 (page 32, paragraph 1.2.1, see sections 1.1 and 1.2 
and pages 48-45). The design development documents were 
completed and approved in November 1982. Brixen & Christopher 
documented this in writing to Elton and Laub and billed for 
-19-
services rendered through the completion of the design 
development phase. Exs. 1 (page 77) & 42. When the project 
finally ground to a halt because Elton and Laub failed to pay 
the amounts outstanding, the third "construction documents" 
phase was nearly complete and Brixen & Christopher had incurred 
expenses of over $25/000 for the work of engineering 
consultants. The trial court awarded Brixen & Christopher the 
amounts that it had earned based on services to the extent that 
they were rendered. 
Time and again, over and over, by letters, documented 
telephone calls, meetings, and billings, Elton and Laub were 
told every step of the way what was happening and what had been 
accomplished. Elton and Laub regularly not only observed the 
progress but pushed Brixen & Christopher to move ahead. In 
addition, they were continually involved in the project through 
the Wolf Creek staff. Never did Elton and Laub object to the 
work of Brixen & Christopher; on the contrary, they praised the 
work. Never did Elton and Laub object to the billings; on the 
contrary, they promised to pay and expressed embarrassment over 
the lack of payment. It is readily apparent from the portions 
of the record cited above in support of the trial court's 
findings of fact that the judgment in favor of Brixen & 
Christopher is well-grounded in the evidence. The mystery is 
not why the trial court decided in favor of Brixen & 
Christopher, but how Elton could have expected otherwise. 
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Elton's argument is mostly surplusage. First, Elton 
argues that the court must enforce the contract as made. 
Unfortunately for Elton, the trial court did exactly that. 
Second, Elton's claims about Brixen & Christopher's 
alleged failure to obtain approvals is wholly lacking in 
substance. With regard to the schematic design phase, Elton 
merely expresses disappointment with the trial court's 
determination that the schematic design phase was approved at 
the meeting on July 28, 1982, but he grudgingly admits that the 
trial court could properly so find on "disputed evidence." See 
Brief of Elton and Laub at 15. Elton's observation that the 
third "construction documents" phase was never approved adds 
nothing. First, it is not quite true. Not only did Wolf Creek 
approve of the construction documents for the site work, but it 
put the job out for bid based on those construction documents. 
Second, the rest of the construction documents were not 
approved because, due to Elton and Laub's failure to pay, they 
were never completed. Accordingly, the trial court awarded 
compensation to Brixen & Christopher based on 85%, rather than 
100%, completion of the third phase. 
In maintaining that the second "design development" 
phase was not approved, Elton quotes part of an answer but, 
without any indication of the omission, deletes the part of the 
answer that undercuts his claim. Compare Brief of Elton and 
Laub at 16 with R 365 (lines 1-3). Christopher's testimony 
was, in substance, that no "formal" approval was obtained, but 
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design and development documents were submitted, see R 364, and 
the approval came in the form of "a second of what we were 
doing,M R 365. As Christopher explained: 
this is the way projects work. It's a normal flow of 
information. And your approvals came by having 
meetings. And you keep going — you say, Hyes, that's 
fine, keep going." And we had numerous meetings in 
this case as we do in all cases, just a normal flow of 
corroboration and information between architects and 
client representatives. 
R 369-70. William Browning, an architect and expert witness, 
explained that in practice approvals may come in such simple 
discussions. R 384. The contract required nothing more and 
did not impose any restrictions on the manner in which the 
approval could be given. The contract did require Elton and 
Laub to notify Brixen & Christopher in writing of any fault in 
the project. Ex. 1 (pages 31-30, section 2.9). Elton and Laub 
never notified Brixen & Christopher, in writing or otherwise, 
that it was going too far or that any of Brixen & Christopher's 
many writings were incorrect, If Elton and Laub in fact 
believed there was some further technical requirement to 
approval and that they were not approving the design 
development phase, events would not have transpired as they 
did. Elton and Laub would not have passively stood by without 
objection when Christopher referred to the completion of the 
design development phase in his November 26, 1987 letter and 
included with the letter a statement for services rendered 
through completion of the second "design development" phase. 
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When Christopher sought payment because the construction 
documents were nearly complete, Elton would not have said he 
would facilitate payment. When Christopher persisted in 
seeking payment, Elton would not have promised to pay interest. 
Elton states that Christopher admitted that Laub 
objected to the schematic design submitted on July 28, 1982 and 
that Laub was concerned about costs exceeding a limitation 
established in March 1982. Both claims are wrong. Christopher 
testified that, even though Laub requested certain refinements, 
the design was approved and Brixen & Christopher was instructed 
to proceed. Christopher also testified that the design 
presented at the July 28, 1982 meeting already had undergone 
much client review and refinement, "which was really beyond 
schematic.H R 313. Likewise, Christopher testified that the 
projected costs were in line with the budget that had been 
established by Laub, and further that neither Elton nor Laub 
objected to the cost estimates. R 328-30, R 478-79. 
Elton is also wrong when he states that Christopher's 
testimony was that the change in the mechanical system was part 
of design development. As the mechanical engineer testified, 
construction design of the mechanical system was complete and 
ready to bid, R 224-25, when the Wolf Creek staff decided to 
consider changing to a substantially different type of 
mechanical system utilizing heat pumps. R 269-73. Thus, the 
mechanical system was not only past the second "design 
development" phase, but the work for the third "construction 
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document" phase had been completed so far as the mechanical 
system was concerned. The fallacy in Elton's reasoning is that 
he assumes that the fact a change is being made is indicative 
of the phase of the project being worked on. To the contrary, 
changes can be made at any time, whether in the schematic 
design phase, the design development phase, the construction 
document phase, or after the project has been bid and the 
construction has begun. See R 158, R 316-17, ex. 1 (pages 
32-31, para. 1.5.14 & section 1.7, paras. 1.7.12 & .13) (change 
orders during final "construction administration" phase). 
Elton had been told that the construction documents were nearly 
complete on January 17, 1983, and Brixen & Christopher had then 
billed based on 85% completion of the construction documents. 
Thus, Elton had no reason to be surprised that changing the 
mechanical system would require additional redesign fees, ex. 1 
(page 83), and he implicitly accepted the cost of those fees 
and seemed to acknowledge that construction documents were 
about ready for bid when he wrote Christopher on February 23, 
1983: "When Wolf Creek goes to bid on the Recreation Center, 
we should have incorporated the mechanical systems change you 
discussed with Scott." Ex. 1 (page 84). 
Brixen & Christopher kept its side of the bargain but 
finally pulled off the project when it became clear that Elton 
and Laub were not making good on their promises to pay for the 
services rendered. The trial court properly awarded judgment 
for the work performed. 
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POINT II. ELTON IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT BRIXEN & 
CHRISTOPHER'S SERVICES WERE AUTHORIZED. 
Elton and Laub not only were informed of the progress 
on the project every step of the way, but they urged Brixen & 
Christopher on. This case presents a textbook example of 
circumstances appropriate for application of equitable 
estoppel. "The elements of equitable estoppel are: 'conduct 
by one party which leads another party, in reliance thereon, to 
adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or damage if 
the first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct.1 United 
American Life Insurance Co. v. Zions First National Bank, Utah, 
641 P.2d 158, 161 (1982) (footnote omitted).- Blackhurst v. 
Transamerica Insurance Co., 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 1985). 
Estoppel may be based on a party's "silence when he ought to 
speak." Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Utah 1980.). 
Even if, contrary to the findings of the trial court, Brixen & 
Christopher had not obtained approvals and did not have 
authority to proceed as it did, Elton is estopped due to the 
utter failure of Elton and Laub to do anything at all to 
communicate to Brixen & Christopher their alleged dispute with 
(1) the July 1982 statement for services; (2) the August 2, 
1982 letter of Christopher; (3) the September 30, 1982 
statement for services; (4) the October 4, 1982 bid package for 
grading and site work; (5) the November 2, 1982 letter of 
Christopher; (6) the November 26, 1982 letter of Christopher; 
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(7) the November 26, 1982 statement for services; (8) the 
January 17, 1983 statement for services.12 
For over six months after the July 28, 1982 meeting 
when Brixen & Christopher was given authorization to go forward 
with the project^ Elton and Laub let Brixen & Christopher 
proceed full speed ahead. Far from holding back work on the 
recreation center, Elton and Laub were anxious for the work to 
go forward so they could use progress on the recreation center 
as a selling point for marketing condominiums in the Wolf Creek 
development. R 166, R 172-73. As recorded in Christopher's 
August 2, 1982 letter, Elton and Laub planned Hto initiate 
construction as soon as possible." Ex. 1 (pages 34-33). In 
his September 20, 1982 letter, Christopher recognized their 
"desire for an early construction start,N but recommended that 
fall construction include only grading and site work based on 
recent soils reports and discussions with the structural 
engineer and the soils engineer. Ex. 1 (pages 46-45). And far 
from disapproving in any way the design that had been 
submitted, Wolf Creek used artistic renderings of the design to 
promote sales of condominium units. R 167, R 170-71, R 175, R 
475-76. 
1 2
 Although waiver is a concept distinct from estoppel, 
Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983), the estoppel 
here encompasses waiver also because even if the contract had 
required more in the way of approval, Elton waived the 
condition Hby receiving further performance from the other 
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Wolf Creek's conduct when the final plans and 
specifications for the site work were delivered was also 
inconsistent with the position Elton now takes.13 Laub was at 
Wolf Creek on October 4, 1982 when the package was 
hand-delivered by Christopher. After meeting with the Wolf 
Creek staff, Christopher told Laub that he had delivered the 
package and talked to Laub about whether Laub wanted to go 
ahead with the site work that fall. The bid package was not 
only accepted, but it was let out for bid and a favorable bid 
was obtained from a firm called Terra Ferma.14 R 192-93. 
Elton cannot rely on the rule that a party acting with 
knowledge may not claim estoppel. Nothing is more apparent 
from the record in this case than that Brixen & Christopher 
believed based on the conduct of Elton and Laub that it was 
(Footnote 12 continued.) 
party, with knowledge that the condition ha[d] not been 
performed." 3A A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 755 at 497 
(1960) (footnote omitted). The reliance of Brixen & 
Christopher Hjustifies the added description of estoppel." Id. 
§ 752 at 481 (footnote omitted). 
13
 As reflected in the August 2, 1982 letter agreement, the 
work was to include three bidding packages: (1) site 
preparation and excavation; (2) reinforced concrete; and (3) 
general architectural, mechanical, electrical, and site 
development. (Ex. 1 (page 33). 
14
 Laub denied at trial that he knew that the package had 
been bid, but he recalled it being bid and who the low bidder 
was when he met with Brixen & Christopher on July 27, 1983, as 
Christopher's notes of that meeting reflect. R 476-77, ex. 1 
(pages 98-97). 
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authorized to proceed as it did. On appeal, Elton has dropped 
his erroneous claim made and rejected in the trial court, that 
the parties' contract violated the statute of frauds, but has 
recast the claim in a new form. He contends that the attempts 
of Brixen & Christopher to get he and Laub to sign the contract 
that had been agreed to orally and acted upon indicates that 
Brixen & Christopher believed that work past the first 
••schematic design** phase was not authorized. On the contrary, 
it merely shows that Brixen & Christopher wanted the agreement 
that had been reached to be evidenced by a writing signed by 
Elton and Laub. The mistake in Elton's logic is convincingly 
shown, to take one example, by the fact that he claims 
Christopher's September 30 and November 26, 1982 letters show 
that Brixen & Christopher knew the first •'schematic design" 
phase was not approved when the letters actually show that 
progress on the job had progressed beyond the mere initial 
outline stage and statements for services beyond the schematic 
design phase accompanied both letters. 
At all times, Elton, Laub, and their Wolf Creek staff 
did nothing but give Brixen & Christopher the green light. 
Based on the statements and conduct of Elton and Laub, which 
Brixen & Christopher confirmed in writing many times, Brixen & 
Christopher expended over 2,000 hours of architectural staff 
time and incurred expense of over $25,000 for work by 
consulting engineers. It is unfair for Elton to try now to 
-28-
repudiate his agreement to compensate Brixen & Christopher and 
to repudiate their actions that led Brixen & Christopher to 
spend its time and money to provide extensive, substantially 
complete architectural design services. 
CONCLUSION 
This brief is filed only as to appellant Elton as 
appellant Laub has filed bankruptcy. The trial court correctly 
concluded that Elton agreed to pay for all of the services 
performed by Brixen & Christopher and, alternatively, that it 
would be inequitable to permit Elton to escape liability by 
repudiating their conduct in acquiescing in and contributing to 
the continuous work on the architectural design. The trial 
court judgment against Elton should be affirmed. 
DATED: October 8, 1987. 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
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September 30, 1982 statement from Brixen & 
Christopher to Elton and Laub. Ex. 1 (page 90). 
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Club Resort. Ex. 1 (page 50). 
October 4, 1982 notes of Christopher. Ex. 1 
(page 49). 
December 1/ 1982 letter from Elton to Laub 
enclosing: 
(1) November 26/ 1982 letter from 
Christopher to Elton; and 
(2) November 26/ 1982 statement from Brixen 
& Christopher to Elton. Ex. 42 (first 3 
pages). 
January 17/ 1983 statement from Brixen & 
Christopher to Elton. Ex. 1 (page 92). 
January 17/ 1983 notes of Christopher. Ex. 1 
(page 79). 
February 18/ 1983 letter from Christopher to 
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Christopher. Ex. 1 (page 84). 
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April 16/ 1983 notes of Christopher. 
October 17, 1983 notes of Christopher. 
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/ <V % <C ^> $ 
March 4 , 1982 
R E C E I V E D 
MAR 1C 1582 
BhlX^: & CHRISTOPHER 
ARCHITECTS Messrs. Roger H. Elton and 
John H. Laub 
Attorneys at Law 
3900 North Wolf Creek Drive 
Eden# Utah 84 310 
Gentlemen: 
We enjoyed meeting with you yesterday to discuss your 
planned recreational building at Wolf Creek Country Club 
Resort, Eden, Utah. 
We are very pleased that we will be working with you on 
the project, and have included as Attachment MAM to the 
letter, the Scope of Services that we will perform as 
outlined in the February 24, 1982 letter to you from 
Maas Grassli and Associates. We understand that this 
initial agreement will be to perform Programming and 
Schematic Design services only, until authorized by you 
to continue with the project. 
Our fee for complete basic architectural services would be 
based upon 6% of the construction cost of the work designed 
or specified by our firm, or our fee could be by another 
negotiated procedure (hourly, fixed fee, etc.) if you so 
preferred. 
We feel that this is a very important project for the 
Wold Creek Resort and we are certain that we will be able 
to develop an outstanding solution. 
Messrs. Roger H. Elton and Page 2 
John H. Laub 
Your signatures of approval below will serve as Qur notice 
to proceed with Programming and Schematic Design.. Please 
return one of these three signed letters of agreement to 
us for our records, the other two being for each of you. 
Sincerely, 
-•flames W. C h r i s t o p h e r FAIA 
' JWC/je 
E n c l . 
Approved: 
Roger H. Eylton 
John H 
3/,,/f; 
Date 
Datd / 
s± 
tvv I 
: R F C E ! V E D 
SCOPE OF SERVICES .,
 r _, . _ , ™ 
TOPHER 
ARCHITECTS 
I . . Programming and Schematic Design Phase: 
• • • » ' 
Program requirements are reviewed/developed with the client to .' 
insure*an accurate statement of needs and budget. Site design 
and architectural studies are prepared to indicate possible * 
solutions to the problem and then, with the approval of the Owner, 
a design is established for development. .Schematic drawings are 
prepared showing the design/.including site plan, floor plans, 
sections, elevations, and prespective«' 
Our fee requirements for Phase I, Programming and Schematic 
Design, would be on an hourly basis as follows: 
B & C Principals $ 50.00 Per Hour 
MGA Principals $ 40.00 Per Hour 
Associates $ 35.00 Per Hour 
Professionals $ 30.00 Per Hour 
Staff. $ 15.00 Per Hour 
A limit or maximum fee for this phase of vork would be $7,500.00. 
II. Design Development Phase: ty- G &*<• * pyj'1' 
Based upon the approved Schematic Design, detailed drawings 
are developed, indicating materials, architectural, structural, 
mechanical and electrical systems. At this time, a more precise 
statement of probable construction cost Is developed. 
III. Construction Documents Phase: , 
Contract documents consisting of drawings and specifications 
are prepared during this phase, setting forth, In detail, the 
requirements for the construction of the project. 
IV. Bidding or Negotiation Phase: 
Bids or negotiated proposals are received and the construction 
contract is prepared and awarded to the.successful contractor. 
V. Construction Administration Phase: 
The project is visited during the constriuction phase to track the 
progress and quality of the work. Payment requests are reviewed 
and approved, change orders initiated, shop drawings reviewed, 
and other administrative matters attended to as required. 
ATTACHMENT "A" 
issrs Roger H. Elton and 
>hn H. Laub 
>00 North Wolf Creek Drive 
len, Utah 84310 
r MENT 
ily 29, 1982 
unple t ion o f Programming and Schematic Design Phase 
'hase I ) f o r the d e s i g n o f t h e Wolf Creek Recreat ion 
in ter per L e t t e r of Agreement dated March 4, 1982. 
fourly f e e s exceeded agreed upon l i m i t of $ 7 f 5 0 0 . 0 0 ) 
IOUNT DUE: 
August 2, 1982 
Messrs* Roger H. Elton and 
John H. Laub 
Attorneys at Law 
3900 North Wolf Creek Drive 
Eden, Utah 84 310 
Gentlemen: 
We are pleased that you have elected to proceed with the 
architectural work on the Wolf Creek Recreation Center in 
anticipation of an early construction start. 
This letter, which is in accordance with our former agree-
ment of March 4, 1982 will serve as a Letter of Agreement 
between you and our firm for architectural services for the 
project. 
Our fixed fee for basic architectural services will be $71,500 
based upon our construction estimate of $897,750 (19,950 
square feet at $45.00) plus site development costs of $295,000 
as estimated by Maas & Grassli. 
Payments for architectural services will be phased according 
to Attachment "A" of our March 4th agreement in the following 
breakdown: 
Phase I - Schematic Design $ 7,500. 
Phase II - Design Development $16,500. 
Phase III - Construction Documents $30,000. 
Phase IV - Construction Administration $14,000. 
We will issue statements to you monthly as our work progresses. 
0O"3< 
Messrs. Roger H. Elton and Page -2 
John H. Laub 
In an effort to initiate construction as soon as 
possible, we plan to issue our contract documents in 
bidding packages as follows: 
1. Site preparation and excavation 
2. Reinforced concrete 
3. General architectural, mechanical, electrical, 
and site development 
It is our intent to bid the first two packages in time 
for this work to be accomplished in the fall of 1982. 
We will plan to issue the third bid package before the 
end of December. 
Attached to this letter, and as a part of this Agreement, 
are the normal wTerms and Conditions of Agreement Between 
Owner and Architect" from AIA Document B141. These 
articles describe the services and responsibilities of 
the Owner and Architect during the course of the project. 
A signed copy of this letter will verify your approval 
of this Agreement and serve as our notice to proceed with 
the Design Development Phase. 
Sincerely, 
James W. Christopher, FAIA 
JWC/je 
Approval: 
Roger H. Elton 
John H. Laub 
33 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF ACREEM 
ARTICLE 1 
ARCHITECT'S SERVICES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
BASIC SERVICES 
The Architect's Basic Services consist of the live 
phases described in Paragraphs 1.1 through 1.5 and 
include normal structural, mechanical and electrical 
engineering services and any other services included 
in Article 15 as part of Basic Services. 
1.1 SCHEMATIC DESIGN PHASE 
1.1.1 The Architect shall review the program furnished 
by the Owner to ascertain the requirements of the Project 
and shall review the understanding of such requirements 
with the Owner. 
1.1.2 The Architect shall provide a preliminary evalua-
tion of the program and the Project budget requirements, 
each in terms of the other, subject to the limitations set 
forth in Subparagraph 3.2.1. 
1.1.3 The Architect shall review with the Owner alterna-
tive approaches to design and construction of the Project. 
1.1.4 Based on the mutually agreed upon program and 
Project budget requirements, the Architect shall prepare, 
for approval by the Owner, Schematic Design Documents 
consisting of drawings and other documents illustrating 
the scale and relationship of Project components. 
1.1.5 The Architect shall submit to the Owner a State-
ment of Probable Construction Cost based on current 
area, volume or other unit costs. 
1.2 DESICN DEVELOPMENT PHASE 
1.2.1 Based on the approved Schematic Design Docu-
ments and any adjustments authorized by the Owner in 
the program or Project budget, the Architect shall pre-
pare, for approval by the Owner, Design Development 
Documents consisting of drawings and other documents 
to fix and describe the size and character of the entire 
Project as to architectural, structural, mechanical and elec-
trical systems, materials and such other elements as may 
be appropriate. 
1.2.2 The Architect shall submit to the Owner a further 
Statement of Probable Construction Cost. 
1.3 CONSTRUCTION DOCUMENTS PHASE 
1.3.1 Based on the approved Design Development Doc-
uments and any further adjustments in the scope or qual-
ity of the Project or in the Project budget authorized by 
the Owner, the Architect shall prepare, for approval b> 
the Owner, Construction Documents consisting of Draw-
ings and Specifications setting forth in detail the require-
ments for the construction of the Project. 
1.3.2 The Architect shall assist the Owner in the prepara-
tion of the necessary bidding information, bidding forms, 
the Conditions of the Contract, and the form of Agree-
ment between the Owner and the Contractor 
1.3.3 The Architect shall advise the Owner of any adjust-
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ments to previous Statements of Probable Construction 
Cost indicated by changes in requirements or general 
market conditions. 
1.3.4 The Architect shall assist the Owner in connection 
with the Owner's responsibility for filing documents re-
quired for the approval of governmental authorities hav-
ing jurisdiction over the Project. 
1.4 BIDDING OR NEGOTIATION PHASE 
1.4.1 The Architect, following the Owner's approval of 
the Construction Documents and of the latest Statement 
of Probable Construction Cost, shall assist the Owner in 
obtaining bids or negotiated proposals, and assist in 
awarding and preparing contracts for construction. 
1.5 CONSTRUCTION PHASE—ADMINISTRATION 
OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT 
1.5.1 The Construction Phase will commence with the 
award of the Contract for Construction and, together with 
the Architect's obligation to provide Basic Services under 
this Agreement, will terminate when final payment to the 
Contractor is due, or in the absence of a final Certificate 
for Payment or of such due date, sixty days after the Date 
of Substantial Completion of the Work, whichever occurs 
first. 
1.5.2 Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement and 
incorporated in the Contract Documents, the Architect 
shall provide administration of the Contract for Construc-
tion as set forth below and in the edition of AIA Docu-
ment A201, General Conditions of the Contract for Con-
struction, current as of the date of this Agreement. 
1.5.3 The Architect shall be a representative of the 
Owner during the Construction Phase, and shall advise 
and consult with the Owner. Instructions to the Contrac-
tor shall be forwarded through the Architect. The Archi-
tect shall have authority to act on behalf of the Owner 
only to the extent provided in the Contract Documents 
unless otherwise modified by written instrument in ac-
cordance with Subparagraph 1.5.16. 
1.5.4 The Architect shall visit the site at intervals ap-
propriate to the stage of construction or as otherwise 
agreed by the Architect in writing to become generally 
familiar with the progress and quality of the Work and to 
determine in general if the Work is proceeding in accord-
ance with the Contract Documents. However, the Archi-
tect shall not be required to make exhaustive or con-
tinuous on-site inspections to check the quality or quan-
tity of the Work. On the basis of such on-site observa-
tions as an architect, the Architect shall keep the Owner 
informed of the progress and quality of the Work, and 
>hall endeavor to guard the Owner against defects and 
deficiencies in the Work of the Contractor. 
1.5.5 The Architect shall not have control or charge of 
and shall not be responsible for construction means, 
methods techniques, sequences or procedures, or for 
saretv precautions and programs in connection with the 
Work, for the acts or omissions of the Contractor, Sub-
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.>ntractor< or any other persons performing any of the 
/ork. or for the failure of any of them to carry out the 
/ork in accordance with the Contract Documents. 
5.6 The Architect shall at all times have access to the 
/ork wherever it is in preparation or progress. 
5.7 The Architect shall determine the amounts owing 
> the Contractor based on observations at the site and on 
valuations of the Contractor's Applications for Payment, 
id shall issue Certificates for Payment in such amounts. 
> provided in the Contract Documents. 
5.8 The issuance of a Certificate for Payment shall 
Dnstitute a representation by the Architect to the Owner, 
ased on the Architect's observations at the site as pro-
ided in Subparagraph 1.5.4 and on the data comprising 
ie Contractor's Application for Payment, that the Work 
as progressed to the point indicated; that, to the best of 
">e Architect's knowledge, information and belief, the qual-
ly of the Work is in accordance with the Contract Docu-
ments (subject to an evaluation of the Work for con-
ormance with the Contract'Documents upon Substantial 
Completion, to the results of any subsequent tests re-
hired by or performed under the Contract Documents, 
o minor deviations from the Contract Documents cor-
ectable prior to completion, and to any specific qualifica-
ions stated in the Certificate for Payment); and that the 
Zontractor is entitled to payment in the amount certified. 
However, the issuance of a Certificate for Payment shall 
iot be a representation that the Architect has made any 
examination to ascertain how and for what purpose the 
Contractor has used the moneys paid on account o\ the 
Contract Sum. 
1.5.9 The Architect shall be the interpreter of the re-
quirements of the Contract Documents and the judge of 
the performance thereunder by both the Owner and 
Contractor. The Architect shall render interpretations nec-
essary for the proper execution or progress of the Work 
with reasonable promptness on written request of either 
the Owner or the Contractor, and shall render written de-
cisions, within a reasonable time, on alt claims, disputes 
and other matters in question between the Owner and the 
Contractor relating \o the execution or progress of the 
Work or the interpretation of the Contract Documents. 
1.5.10 Interpretations and decisions of the Architect shall 
be consistent with the intent of and reasonably inferable 
from the Contract Documents and shall be in written or 
graphic form. In the capacity of interpreter and judge, 
the Architect shall endeavor to secure faithful perform-
ance by both the Owner and the Contractor, shall not 
show partiality to either, and shall not be liable for the 
result of any interpretation or decision rendered in goad 
faith in such capacity. 
1.5.11 The Architect's decisions in matters relating to 
artistic effect shall be final \i consistent with the intent of 
the Contract Documents. The Architect's decisions on 
any other claims, disputes or other matters, including 
those in question between the Owner and the Contractor, 
shall be subject to arbitration as provided in this Agree-
ment and in the Contract Documents. 
1.5.12 The Architect shall have authoritv to reject Work 
which docs not conform to the Contract Documents. 
Whenever, in the Architect's reasonable opinion, it i> 
necessary or advisable for the implementation of the intent 
of the Contract Documents, the Architect will have author-
ity to require special inspection or testing of the Work in 
accordance with the provisions of the Contract Docu-
ments, whether or not such Work be then fabricated, in-
stalled or completed. 
1.5.13 The Architect shall review and approve or take 
other appropriate action upon the Contractor's submittals 
such as Shop Drawings, Product Data and Samples, but 
only for conformance with the design concept of the 
Work and with the information given in the Contract 
Documents. Such action shall be taken with reasonable 
promptness so as to cause no delay. The Architect's ap-
proval of a specific item shall not indicate approval of an 
assembly of which the item is a component. 
1.5.14 The Architect shall prepare Change Orders for 
the Owner's approval and execution in accordance with 
the Contract Documents,and shall have authority to order 
minor changes in the Work not involving an adjustment 
in the Contract Sum or an extension of the Contract Time 
which are not inconsistent with the intent of the Contract 
Documents. • .. 
1.5.15 The Architect shall conduct inspections to deter-
mine the Dates of Substantial Completion and final com-
pletion, shall receive and forward to the Owner for the 
Owner's review written warranties and related documents 
required by the Contract Documents and assembled by 
the Contractor, and shall issue a final Certificate for Pay-
ment. 
1.5.16 The extent of the duties, responsibilities and lim-
itations of authority of the Architect as the Owner's rep-
resentative during construction shall not be modified or 
extended without written consent of the Owner, the Con-
tractor and the Architect. 
1.6 PROJECT REPRESENTATION BEYOND BASIC SERVICES 
1.6.1 If the Owner and Architect agree that more ex-
tensive representation at the site than h described in 
Paragraph 1.5 shall be provided, the Architect shall pro-
vide one or more Project Representatives to assist the 
Architect in carrying out such responsibilities at the site. 
1.6.2 Such Project Representatives shall be selected, em-
ployed and directed by the Architect, and the Architect 
shall be compensated therefor as mutually agreed be-
tween the Owner and the Architect as set forth in an ex-
hibit appended to this Agreement, which shall describe 
the duties, responsibilities and limitations of authority of 
such Project Representatives. 
1.6.3 Through the observations by such Project Repre-
sentatives, the Architect shall endeavor to provide further 
protection for the Owner against defects and deficiencies 
in the Work, but the furnishing of such project representa-
tion shall not modify the rights, responsibilities or obliga-
tions of the Architect as described in Paragraph 1.5. 
1.7 ADDITIONAL SERVICES 
The following Services are hot included in Basic 
Services unless so identified in Article 15. They shall 
be provided if authorized or confirmed in writing by 
the Owner, and they shall be paid for by the Owner 
as provided in this Agreement, in addition to the 
compensation for Basic Services. 
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1.7.2 Providing financial feasibility or other special 
studies. 
1.7.3 Providing planning surveys, site evaluations, envi-
ronmental studies or comparative studies of prospective 
sites, and preparing special surveys, studies and submis-
sions required for approvals of governmental authorities 
or others having jurisdiction over the Project. 
1.7.4 Providing services relative to future facilities, sys-
tems and equipment which are not intended to be con-
structed dur ing the Construction Phase. 
1.7.5 Providing services to investigate existing conditions 
or facilities or to make measured drawings thereof, or to 
verify the accuracy of drawings or other information fur-
nished by the Owner. 
1.7.6 Preparing documents of alternate, separate or 
sequential bids or providing extra services in connection 
w i th b idding, negotiation or construction prior to the 
complet ion of the Construction Documents Phase, when 
requested by the Owner. 
1.7.7 Providing coordination of Work performed by 
separate contractors or by the Owner's own forces 
1.7.8 Providing services in connection wi th the work ot 
a construction manager or separate consultants retained 
by the Owner. 
1.7.9 Providing Detailed Estimates of Construction Cost, 
analyses of owning and operating costs, or detailed quan-
tity surveys or inventories of material, equipment and 
labor. 
1.7.10 Providing interior design and other similar ser-
vices required for or in connection wi th the selection, 
procurement or installation of furniture, furnishings and 
related equipment. 
1.7.11 Providing services for planning tenant or rental 
spaces. 
1.7.12 Making revisions in Drawings, Specifications or 
other documents when such revisions are inconsistent 
w i th wr i t ten approvals or instructions previously given, 
are required by the enactment or revision of codes, laws 
or regulations subsequent to the preparation of such doc-
uments or are due to other causes not solely wi th in the 
control of the Architect. 
1.7.13 Preparing Drawings, Specifications and supporting 
data and providing other services in connection wi th 
Change Orders to the extent that the adjustment in the 
Basic Compensation resulting from the adjusted Con-
struction Cost is not commensurate wi th the services re-
quired of the Architect, provided such Change Orders are 
required by causes not solely within the control of the 
Architect. 
1.7.14 Making investigations, surveys, valuations, inven-
tories or detailed appraisals of existing facilities, and serv-
ices required in connection wi th construction performed 
by the Owner. 
1.7.15 Providing consultation concerning replacement of 
any Work damaged by fire or other cause during con-
struction, and rurni>hmg services as may be required in 
connection with the replacement of such Work. 
1.7.16 Providing services made necessary by the default 
of the Contractor, or by major defects or deficiencies in 
the Work of the Contractor, or by failure of performance 
of either the Owner or Contractor under the Contract for 
Construction. 
1.7.17 Preparing a set of reproducible record drawings 
showing significant changes in the Work made during 
construction based on marked-up prints, drawings and 
other data furnished by the Contractor to the Architect. 
1.7.18 Providing extensive assistance in the ut i l izat ion of 
any equipment or system such as initial start-up or testing, 
adjusting and balancing, preparation of operat ion and 
maintenance manuals, training personnel for operation 
and maintenance, and consultation during operat ion. 
1.7.19 Providing services after issuance to the Owner of 
the final Certificate for Payment, or in the absence of a 
final Certificate for Payment, more than sixty days after 
the Date of Substantial Complet ion of the Work . 
1.7.20 Preparing to serve or serving as in expert witness 
in connection wi th any public hearing, arbitrat ion pro-
ceeding or legal proceeding. 
1.7.21 Providing services of consultants for other than 
the normal architectural, structural, mechanical and elec-
trical engineering services for the Project. 
1.7.22 Providing any other services not otherwise in-
cluded in this Agreement or not customarily furnished in 
accordance wi th generally accepted architectural practice. 
1.8 TIME 
1.8.1 The Architect shall perform Basic and Addi t ional 
Services as expeditiously as is consistent w i th professional 
skill and care and the orderly progress of the Work . Upon 
request of the Owner, the Architect shall submit for the 
Owner's approval, a schedule for the performance of the 
Architect's services which shall be adjusted as required as 
the Project proceeds, and shall include allowances for peri-
ods of time required for the Owner's review and approval 
of submissions and for approvals of authorit ies having 
jurisdiction over the Project. This schedule, when approved 
by the Owner, shall not, except for reasonable cause, be 
exceeded by the Architect. 
ARTICLE 2 
THE OWNER'S RESPONSIBILITIES 
2.1 The Owner shall provide ful l information regarding 
requirements for trVe Project including a program, which 
shall set forth the Owner's design objectives, constraints 
and criteria, including space requirements and relation-
ships, flexibility and expandability, special equipment and 
systems and site requirements. 
2.2 If the Owner provides a budget for the Project it 
shall include contingencies for b idding, changes* in the 
Work during construction, and other costs wh ich are the 
responsibility of the Owner, including those described in 
this Article 2 and in Subparagraph 3.1.2. The Owner shall, 
at the request of the Architect, provide a statement of 
funds available for the Project, and their source. 
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2.3 The Owner shall designate, when necessary, a rep-
resentative authorized to act in the Owner's behalf with 
respect to the Project. The Owner or such authorized 
representative shall examine the documents submitted by 
the Architect and shall render decisions pertaining thereto 
promptly, to avoid unreasonable delay in the progress of 
the Architect's services. 
2.4 The Owner shall furnish a legal description and a 
certified land survey of the site, giving, as applicable, 
grades and lines of streets, alleys, pavements and adjoin-
ing property; rights-of-way, restrictions, easements, en-
croachments, zoning, deed restrictions, boundaries and 
contours of the site; locations, dimensions and complete 
data pertaining to existing buildings, other improvements 
and trees; and full information concerning available serv-
ice and utility lines both public and private, above and 
below grade, including inverts and depths. 
2.5 The Owner shall furnish the services of-soil engi-
neers or other consultants when such services are deemed 
necessary by the Architect. Such services shall include test 
borings, test pits, soil bearing values, percolation tests, air 
and water pollution tests, ground corrosion and resistivity 
tests, including necessary operations for determining sub-
soil, air and water conditions, with reports and appropri-
ate professional recommendations. 
2.6 The Owner shall furnish structural, mechanical, 
chemical and other laboratory tests, inspections and re-
ports as required by law or the Contract Documents. 
2.7 The Owner shall furnish all legal, accounting and in-
surance counseling services as may be necessary at any 
time for the Project, including such auditing services as 
the Owner may require to verify the Contractor's Applica-
tions for Payment or to ascertain how or for what pur-
poses the Contractor uses the moneys paid by or on be-
half of the Owner. 
2.8 The services, information, surveys and reports re-
quired by Paragraphs 2.4 through 2.7 inclusive shall be 
furnished at the Owner's expense, and the Architect shall 
be entitled to rely upon the accuracy and completeness 
thereof. 
2.9 If the Owner observes or otherwise becomes aware 
of any fault or defect in the Project or nonconformance 
with the Contract Documents, prompt written notice 
thereof shall be given by the Owner to the Architect. 
2.10 The Owner shall furnish required information and 
services and shall render approvals and decisions as ex-
peditiously as necessary for the orderly progress of the 
Architect's services and of the Work. 
ARTICLE 3 
CONSTRUCTION COST 
3.1 DEFINITION 
3.1.1 The Construction Cost shall be the total cost or 
estimated cost to the Owner of all elements of the Project 
designed or specified by the Architect. 
3.1.2 The Construction Cost shall include at current 
market rates, including a reasonable allowance for over-
head and profit, the cost of labor and materials furnished 
by the Owner and any equipment which has been de-
signed, specified, selected or specially provided for by 
the Architect. 
3.1.3 Construction Cost does not include the compen-
sation of the Architect and the Architect's consultants, 
the cost of the land, rights-of-way, or other costs which 
are the responsibility of the Owner as provided in Arti-
cle 2. • 
3.2 RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSTRUCTION COST 
3.2.1 Evaluations of the Owner's Project budget, State-
ments of Probable Construction Cost and Detailed 
Estimates of Construction Cost, if any, prepared by the 
Architect, represent the Architect's best judgment as a 
design professional familiar with the construction indus-
try. It is recognized, however, that neither the Architect 
nor the Owner has control over the cost of labor, mate-
rials or equipment, over the Contractor's methods of de-
termining bid prices, or over competitive bidding, market 
or negotiating conditions. Accordingly, the Architect 
cannot and does not warrant or represent that bids or 
negotiated prices will not vary from the Project budget 
proposed, established or approved by the Owner, if any, 
or from any Statement of Probable Construction Cost or 
other cost estimate or evaluation prepared by the Archi-
tect. 
3.2.2 No fixed limit of Construction Cost shall be estab-
lished as a condition of this Agreement by the furnishing, 
proposal or establishment of a Project budget under Sub-
paragraph 1.1.2 or Paragraph 2.2 or otherwise, unless such 
fixed limit has been agreed upon in writing and signed by 
the parties hereto. If such a fixed limit has been estab-
lished, the Architect shall be permitted to include con-
tingencies for design, bidding and price escalation, to de-
termine what materials, equipment, component systems 
and types of construction are to be included in the Con-
tract Documents, to make reasonable adjustments in the 
scope of the Project and to include in the Contract Docu-
ments alternate bids to adjust the Construction Cost to the 
fixed limit. Any such fixed limit shall be increased in the 
amount of any increase in the Contract Sum occurring 
after execution of the Contract for Construction. 
3.2.3 If the Bidding or Negotiation Phase has not com-
menced within three months after the Architect submits 
the Construction Documents to the Owner, any Project 
budget or fixed limit of Construction Cost shall be ad-
justed to reflect any change in the general level of prices 
in the construction industry between the date of submis-
sion of the Construction Documents to the Owner and 
the date on which proposals aire sought. 
3.2.4 If a Project budget or fixed limit of Construction 
Cost (adjusted as provided in Subparagraph 3.2.3) is ex-
ceeded by the lowest bona fide bid or negotiated pro-
posal, the Owner shall (1) give written approval of an 
increase in such fixed limit, (2) authorize rebidding or re-
negotiating of the Project within a reasonable time, (3) if 
the Project is abandoned, terminate in accordance with 
Paragraph 10.2, or (4) cooperate in revising the Project 
scope and quality as required to reduce the Construction 
Cost. In the case of (4), provided a fixed limit of Construc-
tion Cost has been established as a condition of this Agree-
ment, the Architect, without additional charge, shall mod-
ify the Drawings and Specifications as necessary to comply 
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with the fixed limit. The providing of such service shall be 
the limit of the Architect's responsibility arising from the 
establishment of such fixed limit, and having done so, the 
Architect shall be entitled to compensation for all services 
performed, in accordance with this Agreement, whether 
or not the Construction Phase is commenced. 
ARTICLE 4 
DIRECT PERSONNEL EXPENSE 
4.1 Direct Personnel Expense is defined as the direct sal-
aries of ail the Architect's personnel engaged on the Proj-
ect, and the portion of the cost of their mandatory and 
customary contributions and benefits related thereto, such 
as employment taxes and other statutory employee bene-
fits, insurance, sick leave, holidays, vacations, pensions 
and similar contributions and benefits. 
ARTICLE 5 
REIMBURSABLE EXPENSES 
5.1 Reimbursable Expenses are in addition to the Com-
pensation for Basic and Additional Services and include 
actual expenditures made by the Architect and the Archi-
tect's employees and consultants in the interest of the 
Project for the expenses listed in the following Sub-
paragraphs: 
5.1.1 Expense of transportation in connection with the 
Project; living expenses in connection with out-of-town 
travel; long distance communications, and iees paid for 
securing approval of authorities having jurisdiction over 
the Project., 
5.1.2 Expense of reproductions, postage and handling of 
Drawings, Specifications and other documents, excluding 
reproductions for the office use of the Architect and the 
Architect's consultants. 
5.1.3 Expense of data processing and photographic pro-
duction techniques when used in connection with Addi-
tional Services. 
5.1.4 If authorized in advance by the Owner, expense of 
overtime work requiring higher than regular rates. 
5.1.5 Expense of renderings, models and mock-ups re-
quested by the Owner. 
5.1.6 Expense of any additional insurance coverage or 
limits, including professional liability insurance, requested 
by the Owner in excess of that normally carried by the 
Architect and the Architect's consultants. 
ARTICLE 6 
PAYMENTS TO THE ARCHITECT 
6.1 PAYMENTS ON ACCOUNT OF BASIC SERVICES 
6^*1*1 An initial payment as set forth in Paragraph T ^ - t ^ 
the mTrYrroqm payment under this Agreemenr^^^-^^ 
6.1.2 Subsequen^fcayments for Ba i^e-Services shall be 
made monthly and shaTH^eJn^ i^tJportion to services per-
formed within each Pba5eoT>e€vkes, on the basis set 
forth in Art icle>K^^ ^ " ^ - ^ ^ 
6.1.3Ji^f)3to the extent that the Contract T^ n^ te^ Qitially 
,0*t3t>lished in the Contract for Construction is exceeftwl* 
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6.1.4 When compensation is based on a percentage of 
Construction Cost, and any portions of the Project are 
deleted or otherwise not constructed, compensation for 
such portions of the Project shall be payable to the extent 
services are performed on such portions, in accordance 
with the schedule set forth in Subparagraph 14.2.2, based 
on (1) the lowest bona fide bid or negotiated proposal or, 
(2) if no such bid or proposal is received, the most recent 
Statement of Probable Construction Cost or Detailed Esti-
mate of Construction Cost for such portions of the Project. 
6.2 PAYMENTS ON ACCOUNT OF 
ADDITIONAL SERVICES 
6.2.1 Payments on account of the Architect's Additional 
Services as defined in Paragraph 1.7 and for Reimbursable 
Expenses as defined in Article 5 shall be made monthly 
upon presentation of the Architect's statement of services 
rendered or expenses incurred. 
6.3 PAYMENTS WITHHELD 
6.3.1 No deductions shall be made from the Architect's 
compensation on account of penalty, liquidated damages 
or other sums withheld from payments to contractors, or 
on account of the cost of changes in the Work other than 
those for which the Architect is held legally liable. 
6.4 PROJECT SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION 
6.4.1 If the Project is suspended or abandoned in whole 
or in part for more than three months, the Architect shall 
be compensated for all services performed prior to receipt 
of written notice from the Owner of such suspension or 
abandonment, together with Reimbursable Expenses then 
due and all Termination Expenses as defined in Paragraph 
10.4. If the Project is resumed after being suspended for 
more than three months, the Architect's compensation 
shall be equitably adjusted. 
ARTICLE 7 
ARCHITECT'S ACCOUNTING RECORDS 
7.1 Records of Reimbursable Expenses and expenses per-
taining to Additional Services and services performed on 
the basis of a "Multiple of Direct Personnel Expense shall 
be kept on the basfs of generally accepted accounting 
principles and shall be available to the, Owner or the 
Owner's authorized representative at mutually convenient 
times. 
ARTICLE 8 
OWNERSHIP AND USE OF DOCUMENTS 
8.1 Drawings and Specifications as instruments of serv-
ice are and shalj remain the property of the Architect 
whether the Project for which they are made is executed 
or not. The Owner shall be permitted to retain copies, in-
cluding reproducible copies, of Drawings and Specifica-
tions for information and reference in connection with the 
Owner's use and occupancy of the Project. The Drawings 
and Specifications shall not be used by the Owner on 
ON • JJLY 197? • AIA* • © 1977 
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ler projects, tor additions to this Project, or for compte-
rs of this Project by others provided the Architect is not 
default under this Agreement, except by agreement in 
ting and with appropriate compensation to the Archi-
t. 
Submission or distribution to meet official regulatory 
luirements or for other purposes in connection with the 
>ject is not to be construed as publication in derogation 
the Architect's rights. 
ARTICLE 9 
ARBITRATION 
I All claims, disputes and other matters in question' 
^ween the parties to this Agreement, arising out ofyOr 
a\ing to this Agreement or the breach thereof, shal/be 
cia^d by arbitration in accordance with the Construe-
>n Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Xrbitra-
>n Association then obtaining unless the partes mute-
ly agree\therwise. No arbitration, arising o\f\ of or re-
ting to thiVAgreement, shall include, by consolidation, 
inder or in a\y other manner, any additional person not 
party to this Agreement except by written consent con-
ining a specificWerence to this Agreement and signed 
i the Architect, tnWOwner, and any/Other penon sought 
i be joined. Any cohsent to arbitration involving an ad-
itional person or persfems shall not constitute consent to 
bitration of any dispufft not described therein or with 
iy person not named or\jestribed therein. This Agree-
ment to arbitrate and any agreement to arbitrate with an 
dditional person or perstfos>duly consented to by the 
arties to this Agreement shall oe specifically enforceable 
nder the prevailing arbitration laV 
.2 Notice of the demand for arbitration shall be filed in 
/rating with the omer party to this Agreement and with 
he American Acoitration Association. The demand shall 
»e made withir/a reasonable time after tneclaim, dispute 
»r other matter in question has arisen. In >*p event shall 
be demancMor arbitration be made after tnk date when 
nstitutior/of legal or equitable proceedingsNbased on 
uch clarm, dispute or other matter in question ^ould be 
»arred4)y the applicable statute of limitations. \ 
>.3/The award rendered by the arbitrators shall be Hnal, 
ina judgment may be entered upon it in accordance with 
rpplicable law in any court having jurisdiction thereof. \ 
ARTICLE 10 
TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT 
10.1 This Agreement may be terminated by either party 
upon seven days' written notice should the other party 
fail substantially to perform in accordance with its terms 
through no fault of the party initiating the termination. 
10.2 This Agreement may be terminated by the Owner 
upon at least seven days' written notice to the Architect 
in the event that the Project is permanently abandoned. 
10.3 In the event of termination not the fault of the Ar-
chitect, the Architect shall be compensated for all services 
performed to termination date, together with Reimburs-
able Expenses then due and all Termination Expenses as 
defined in Paragraph 10.4. 
10.4 Termination Expenses include expenses directly at-
tributable to termination for which the Architect is not 
otherwise compensated, plus an amount computed as a 
percentage of the total Basic and Additional Compensa-
tion earned to the time of termination, as follows: 
.1 20 percent if termination occurs during the Sche-
matic Design Phase; or 
.2 10 percent if termination occurs during the Design 
Development Phase; or 
.3 5 percent if termination occurs during any subse-
quent phase. 
ARTICLE 11 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
11.1 Unless otherwise specified, this Agreement shall be 
governed by the law of the principal place of business of 
the Architect. 
11.2 Terms in this Agreement shall have the same mean-
ing as those in AIA Document A201, General Conditions 
of the Contract for Construction, current as of the date 
of this Agreement. 
11.3 As between the parties to this Agreement: as to all 
acts or failures to act by either party to this Agreement, 
any applicable statute of limitations shall commence to 
run and any alleged cause of action shall be deemed to 
have accrued in any and all events not later than the rele-
vant Date of Substantial Completion of the Work, and as 
to any acts or failures to act occurring after the relevant 
Date of Substantial Completion, not later than the date of 
issuance of the final Certificate for Payment. 
11.4 The Owner and the Architect waive all rights 
against each other and against the contractors, consult-
ants, agents and employees of the other for damages cov-
ered by any property insurance during construction as set 
forth in the edition of AIA Document A201, General Con-
ditions, current as of the date of this Agreement. The 
Owner and the Architect each shall require appropriate 
similar waivers from their contractors, consultants and 
agents. 
ARTICLE 12 
SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS 
12.1 The Owner and the Architect, respectively, bind 
themselves, their partners, successors, assigns and legal 
representatives to the other party to this Agreement and 
to the partners, successors, assigns and legal representa-
tives of such other party with respect to all covenants of 
this Agreement. Neither the Owner nor the Architect shall 
assign, sublet or transfer any interest In this Agreement 
without the written consent of the other. 
ARTICLE 13 
EXTENT OF AGREEMENT 
13.1 This Agreement represents the entire and integrated 
agreement between the Owner and the Architect and 
supersedes all prior negotiations, representations or agree-
ments, either written or oral. This Agreement may be 
amended only by written instrument signed by both 
Owner and Architect. 
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l i «g^-7/fcrl 
Messrs Roger H. Elton and 
John H. Laub 
3900 North Wolf Creek Drive 
Eden, Utah 84310 
^ & £*• 
t**i 
STATEMENT 
July 29, 1982 
Completion of Programming and Schematic Design Phase 
(Phase I) for the design of the Wolf Creek-Recreation 
Center per Letter of Agreement dated March 4, 1982. 
(Hourly fees exceeded agreed upon limit of $7,500.00) 
AMOUNT DUE: $7,500.00 
WOLF CREEK PROPERTIES 
P. O. BOX 633 745-3737 
BRICHAM CITY, UTAH 84302 
23 September
 1Q82 
1275 
87-28/1243 
fle ******BRKEN & CHRISTOPHER ARCHITECTS********* 
****SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED and 0 0 / 1 0 0 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
t*7,500.00* 
Dolla 
0MIOHAM CITY OFFICE 
First Security Bonk of Utah 
•jmo«Ai AStocunon 
MAIN 4 FOREST • BRIGHAM CITY. UTAH 14302 
••00 I Z?Si" 11121*3002881:03^ 0 0 7 3 ? l&n* 
September 30, 1982 
Messrs. Roger H. Elt«i and 
John H. Laub 
Attorneys at Law 
3900 North Wolf Creek Drive 
Eden, Utah . 84310 
Gentlemen: 
I'm sorry that we were not able to meet today to go over 
our progress on the Wolf Creek Recreation Center. 
I had a good meeting with Scott Allen last Friday at Wolf 
Creek to review our contract documents in progress. We 
identified some areas where refinements to the design could 
produce a better solution and have subsequently incorporated 
these into our.drawings. 
We have completed our work on the Phase One Bid Package and 
will deliver the package to Wolf Creek on Monday the 4th for 
issuance to bidders. The package includes all of the earth-
work, a security fence and a construction sign. 
Developing an estimate for the work on this bid package 
has been extremely difficult. We have received estimating 
information from two earthwork contractors that varies 
considerably. Our pricing information develops earthwork 
costs anywhere from $33,000 to $81,000. The huge discrep-
ancy in these figures is due, largely, to unknowns in the 
quality of the fill material available. If we can use 
material at the sewer lagoon site, the cost may approach 
the low figure, provided that eliminating the large boulders 
is not cost prohibitive. If imported fill is purchased 
from a remote source, the cost may approach the high fig-
ure. We remain hopeful that the material at the lagoon 
will be satisfactory. 
Fred, Scott and Clair were here this afternoon so we had 
a chance to review this bid package with them. 
Messrs. Roger H. Elton and Page 2 
John H. Laub 
Work on the other contract documents is progressing well, 
with all of our consulting engineers in full gear in order 
to meet our next deadline. 
I would like very much to receive an executed copy of the 
Owner/Architect Agreement so that I can execute agreements 
with our consulting engineers. 
Thanks very much. 
Sincerely, 
James W. Christopher, FAIA 
JWC/je 
Encl. 
cc: Clair Cox 
'17 
essrs. Roger H. Elton and 
ohn H. Laub 
;900 North Wolf Creek Drive 
Iden, Utah 84310 
•AT: VEN'T 
September 30, 1982 
Completion of design development and contract documents 
for the Phase One Bid Package of site excavation and 
preparation. 
$ 2,500.00 
Balance from 6/29/82 statement 7,500.00 
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE: $10,000.00 
5© 
f 
Mr. Clair Cox 
Wolf Creek Country Club Resort 
3900 North Wolf Creek Drive 
Eden, Utah 84310 
S A N S M I T T A L 
DATE 
PROJECT 
October 4, 1982 
Wolf Creek, Phase One 
ADDRESS 
Eden, Utah 
SUBJECT
 p h a s e 0 n e construction 
Transmitted herewith are five sets of drawings and specifications 
Dr Phase One Construction "Earthwork"f for the Wolf Creek Resort Recrea-
Lon Center, 
B> 
James w. Christopher, FAIA 
mar vpffit- /»/y*Z. 
f ?&/*<% 
ROGER H. ELTON, LTD. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
' EXHIBIT 
4 
PLEASE REPLY TO: 
RENO OFFICE 
f W«*T MCOMO »T SUITE ISO 
M H O . MV 9—Oi 
MAiUMO ADO»tft» 
p o mo* M7« 
«CMO NV W M I 
LAS VEGAS OFFICE 
NINTH ' L O O * 
VAULCT SANA CCNTCR 
»©• CONVENTION CENTER ORIV 
WAS VKttAA. MV WIIO* 
IT02> 7 I 3 M M 
December 1, 1982 
•5 fPIAINTIFPS 
EXHIBIT 
•*1 *^; * ^  
John Laub, Esquire 
Post Office Box 633 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Dear John: 
Enclosed, for your information, is the Recreation Center archi-
tectural contract on Wolf Creek, together with a change order. 
I am not sure the change order is justified. Could you have 
Clair or Scott make a determination? 
Yours truly, 
Roger H. Elton 
RHErrah 
Enclosures 
w 
November 26, 1932 
Mr. Roger H. Elton 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 2878 
Reno, Nevada 89505 
Dear Roger: 
Pursuant to our telephone conversation of last Wednesday, 
I have prepared an amendment to our Letter of Agreement 
dated August 2, 1982 for architectural services for the 
Wolf Creek Recreation Center. 
Since the date of the original Agreement, the scope of the 
project has been more closely defined (and expanded). Extra 
consulting fees will be required for structural design of 
the foundation system and retaining walls due to specialized 
sub-surface conditions as well as in mechanical design for 
a more complex mechanical system based upon our life cycle 
cost analysis. These additional consulting fees total an 
extra $8,000. 
Since the Agreement dated August 2, 1982 has not yet been 
signed by you, I am including two copies of it with the 
amendment for your signature. Ifve also included a statement 
for services to date through completion of Design Development, 
based upon the amended Agreement. 
As you know, we are very anxious to have this Agreement 
signed and returned since we are well into the project and 
still have not been able to execute agreements with our 
consulting engineers. 
Thanks very much for your prompt attention to this request. 
Sincerely, 
James W. Christopher, FAIA 
JWC/je 
Encl. 
Mr. Roger H. Elton 
Roger H. Elton, Ltd. 
P. 0. Box 2878 
Reno, Nevada 89505 
& 
o* 
STATEMENT 
November 26, 1982 
Completion of Design Development documents for the 
Wolf Creek Recreation Center in accordance with payment 
schedule outlined in Amendment No, 1 to Architect/ 
Owner Agreement of August 2, 1982. 
Work Completed 
Phase I - Schematic Design 
Phase II - Design Development 
Total Fee Earned: 
Amount Paid To Date: 
Fee 
$ 8 , 5 0 0 . 
1 9 , 0 0 0 . 
$ 2 7 , 5 0 0 . 
- 0 -
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE: $27,500. 
Ir. Roger H. E l t o n 
toger H. E l t o n , Ltd. 
?. 0 . Box 2878 
teno, Nevada 89505 
TATEMENT 
January 17, 1983 
Progress billing for architectural services for the 
Wolf Creek Recreation Center in accordance with pay-
ment schedule outlined in Amendment No. 1 to Architect/ 
Owner Agreement of August 2, 1982. 
Work Completed Amount 
Phase I - Schematic Design $ 8,500. 
Phase II - Design Development 19,000. 
Phase III - Construction Documents 
85% complete 30,000. 
Total Fee Earned: $57,500, 
Amount Paid to Date: -0-
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE: 
cc: John Laub 
v/'UC' Cs*UAA V066O etfZ/d ^ Q*«& fflM 
PcK&Z- /pc£ "B&ZK) /K*, fr\zj- w/t« 7fesf 7& 
TO J*>/*KJ 4**t/Q ///?/83 
7* 
Dll 
February 18, 1983 
Mr. Roger H. Elton 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 2878 
Reno, Nevada 89505 
Dear Roger: 
This morning we met to discuss the change in mechanical 
systems for the Wolf Creek Recreation Center. In attend-
ance were representatives from our office, Olsen & Peterson 
(our consulting mechanical engineer), Wolf Creek 
(Scott Allen), and Energy Control Systems (manufacturers 
of the heat pump system). 
The study conducted by our office and Olsen & Peterson 
yielded the following results. 
1. Initial Costs 
a) Mechanical System - $12,488 
b) Electrical System + 2,500 
c) Architectural System + 3,500 
Total Savings: - $ 6,500 
2. Operating Costs 
a) Savings per year - $ 2,000 
3. Additional mechanical, electrical, 
and architectural redesign fees + $ 4,380 
The figures look good to us, and our engineers are very com-
fortable with the heat pump system. Other advantages include 
reduced moisture in the building, no propane tank requirements, 
and no rooftop equipment. 
S3 
Mr. Roger H. Elton Page 2 
Scott Allen seems very pleased with the way that the same 
system is performing in the Time Share units and is willing 
to sacrifice the additional space required for the units 
within the building. His recommendation is to design and 
install the heat pump system. 
Scott suggested that I transmit this information to you 
for your consideration, but not to initiate any further 
work until we receive direction from you. 
Sincerely, 
James W. Christopher, FAIA 
JWC/jse 
cc: John H. Laub 
Scott Allen 
ROGER H. ELTON, LTD. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
PLEASE REPLY TO: 
RENO OFFICE 
'EST StCOND ST SLMTL 2~C 
HENO. NV 69S03 
MAILING ADDRESS 
P O IO« ZB7t 
HENO. NV »9S05 
(702 > 7»€> 3BB0 
Reno 
February 23, 1983 
James W. Christopher, FAIA 
Brixen & Christopher Architects 
252 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Jim: 
When Wolf Creek goes to bid on the Recreation Center, 
we should have incorporated the mechanical systems change 
you discussed with Scott. 
Yours truly, 
LAS VEGAS OFFICE 
NtN-TH FLOOR 
VALLEY BANK CENTER 
»Ot CONVENTION CENTER DRIVE 
LAS VEGAS NV 09109 
<702l 733 5966 
Roger H. Elton 
RHE/mk 
cc Scott Allen 
John Laub 
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